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Abstract
The recent proliferation of smart devices has given rise to ubiquitous computing,
an emerging computing paradigm which allows anytime & anywhere computing
possible. In such a ubiquitous computing environment, customers release dif-
ferent computing or sensing tasks, and people, also known as data processors,
participate in these tasks and get paid for providing their idle computing and
communication resources. Thus, how to select an appropriate and reliable cus-
tomer while not disclosing processors’ privacy has become an interesting prob-
lem. In this article, we present a trust-based and privacy-preserving customer
selection scheme in ubiquitous computing, called TPCS, to enable potential pro-
cessors select the customers with good reputation. The basic concept of TPCS is
that each data processor holds a trust value, and the reputation score of the cus-
tomer is calculated based on processors’ trust values and feedbacks via a truth
discovery process. To preserve processors’ privacy, pseudonyms and Paillier
cryptosystem are applied to conceal each processor’s real identity. In addition,
three authentication protocols are designed to ensure that only the valid data
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processors (i.e., the processors registering in the system, holding the truthful
trust values, and joining the computing tasks) can pass the authentication. A
comprehensive security analysis is conducted to prove that our proposed TPCS
scheme is secure and can defend against several sophisticated attacks. More-
over, extensive simulations are conducted to demonstrate the correctness and
effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
Keywords: Ubiquitous computing, trust, privacy-preserving,
selection
1. Introduction
Nowadays, the fast development of smart devices (e.g., vehicles [45, 47],
implantable medical devices [12, 13], wearable devices [19]) embedded with in-
creasingly powerful computational and communication resources, has given rise
to ubiquitous computing, a revolutionary computing paradigm which integrates
surrounding devices to provide numerous novel services at anytime, anywhere,
and by any means [25]. In ubiquitous computing, all objects (e.g., smart de-
vices, human bodies, wireless sensors) can be considered as computers or data
processors. These objects, besides serving themselves, can also participate in
different computing tasks released by the resource-constrained customers (e.g.,
individual users, companies, organizations), and get paid by providing their idle
resources. By doing so, ubiquitous computing is able to greatly make use of
surrounding idle resources and drastically change the ways we live and obtain
services.
Although many benefits can be gained by ubiquitous computing, some new
challenges arise. Since the processors will run automatically under the control
of the customers, the reliability of customers is particularly important. Some
customers may unintentionally or intentionally abuse processors’ resources, give
unexpected reward, or even put processors in dangerous situations. For instance,
by utilizing the computing capacities of surrounding vehicles, traffic problems
such as route navigation or environmental monitoring can be resolved. However,
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Figure 1: Using trust values to link pseudonyms in a given period of time.
some malicious customers may give rewards which do not match processors’
workloads, or collect vehicles’ private information such as location and driving
habits. Thus, it is essential to identify such customers before joining a ubiquitous
computing task. Normally, the performances of customers can be judged by
processors’ feedbacks [14, 15]. However, the problem here is that the feedbacks
given by different processors may vary significantly due to different working
loads, incomplete views of observations, or even malicious evaluations. When
aggregating these feedbacks, traditional methods such as voting or averaging,
which treat all processors equally are not suitable.
An ideal approach to resolve the above challenge is to involve trust values for
all processors and make the aggregated reputation scores closed to the feedbacks
provided by reliable processors. Nevertheless, another critical issue which must
be addressed is the privacy of processors. Although pseudonymous [39] and
anonymous authentication [16, 41] can be used to conceal processor’s identity
information, processors’ location and trajectory privacy may still be disclosed by
linking their trust values. To illustrate, we consider a scenario in Fig. 1. At time
t1, two processors (i.e., the cell phone and the vehicle) join a task, and at time t2
and t3, they join different tasks respectively. Although their pseudonyms have
been changed, their trust values (i.e., TrustA and TrustB) remain unchanged
in a certain period of time. By linking their trust values, the trajectories of
the processors can be easily reconstructed. Hence, it is important to design
a trust-based customers selection scheme which does not sacrifice processors’
privacy.
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In order to address the above challenges, we present a trust-based and
privacy-preserving customer selection scheme, called TPCS, to rank the cus-
tomers according to processors’ feedbacks while not disclosing their privacy. The
general process of TPCS can be described as follows. After finishing a ubiqui-
tous task, processors deliver their feedbacks and encrypted trust values to the
roadside units (RSUs), which will collaborate with the Service Provider (SP)
to calculate the customer’s reputation score using a truth discovery method.
During the whole process, processors’ privacy will not be disclosed to any other
parties. Below, we have summarized the major contributions of this work.
• First, we design a filtering truth discovery based evaluation algorithm
to process the feedback information received from processors. By this
algorithm, the proposed scheme can effectively estimate the performances
of customers and processors. This allows optimal selection of customer in
a ubiquitous computing environment.
• Second, we use pseudonyms and Paillier cryptosystem to protect data
processors’ privacy. Moreover, three authentication protocols are designed
to ensure that only the legitimate processors can pass the authentication.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first attempt to resolve
the security and privacy issues in customers selection in the ubiquitous
computing environment.
• Third, we conduct a comprehensive security analysis to demonstrate that
the scheme presented is not only secure, but can also defend against dif-
ferent sophisticated attacks. Additionally, extensive simulations are per-
formed to validate the correctness & effectiveness of TPCS.
The rest of paper has been organized into 8 sections, where system and threat
model along with design goals have been discussed in section 2, followed by
preliminary discussion in Section 3. The TPCS scheme functionality is explained
in section 5, and its security analysis & evaluation are presented in section 6.
Related works and conclusion are detailed in sections 7 and 8 respectively.
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2. Models and Design Goal
In order to better present the proposed scheme, we first describe the system
model, and give details of the threat model. Based on these, we develop the
design goals of our proposed scheme.
2.1. System Model
The overall model considers a typical scenario of ubiquitous computing. The
RSUs are widely deployed in a given area, and all customers and processors can
communicate with RSUs through their communication resources. Particularly,
the system consists of a trust authority (TA), RSUs, a service provider (SP),
customers, and processors, as shown in Fig. 2.
Trust authority
Service provider
RSUs
Processors
Customers
Customer selection
Data processing
Data reporting
Data reporting
Report aggregation
Reputation calculation 
Trust management
Figure 2: System model.
• Trust Authority (TA): This entity is in charge of all participating parties,
and also maintains a database to store processors’ trust values. We assume
that it is fully capable of storing and performing computation on data
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generated by other entities. After receiving processors’ trust values, it can
predict their future behaviors based on historical data.
• Service Provider (SP): SP connects all RSUs and stores feedbacks and
trust values sent from these roadside units. Upon receiving the data, SP
executes a truth discovery based evaluation algorithm to calculate the
reputation scores for customers. Similarly, for the query of a potential
processor for the task join request, SP can respond it by recommending
the customers with high reputation scores.
• Roadside Units (RSUs): RSUs are subordinates of SP. They are widely
deployed and can cover a wide area. They collect processors’ feedbacks
and trust values, and then forward them to SP. In particular, they have
limited computation capacities, which ensures that they can authenticate
processors’ identities and perform aggregation operations.
• customers: customers can be companies, individual processors, vehicles,
and organizations. They have insufficient computation and communica-
tion capabilities to perform the tasks by themselves, so they give benefits
to hire processors to help them finish their tasks.
• Processors: Each processor is embedded with computation and communi-
cation units which enable them automatically perform the sensing, com-
putation, and communication tasks received from the customers. After
finishing the tasks, each of them will upload its feedback to the nearby
RSU for customer evaluation. Besides, the processors update their trust
values from TA at regular intervals.
2.2. Threat Model
TA is fully trusted because it generates the public and private keys for all
roles. We assume TA is under strong physical protection and cannot be com-
promised. SP and RSUs are both considered to be honest but curious. In other
words, they will honestly perform the given tasks but try to infer processors’
6
location and trajectory privacy by linking their identities or trust values. Note
that, SP and RSU will not collude with each other. This is a common assump-
tion in existing fog-based applications [24, 40, 42]. The customers are supposed
to control the whole ubiquitous computing task. However, their performances
may vary differently. For any customer, its performance may change constantly
in different tasks. As for the processors, they are required to submit their
feedbacks and trust values after each task. However, some selfish or malicious
processors may provide untruthful feedbacks, or some attackers outside the tasks
may give fake feedbacks for their own benefits or with the intention of disrupting
the entire system. For example, a healthcare center may hire some processors
(e.g., patients’ wearable devices, surrounding vehicles or smartphones) to help
it in providing medical care services. However, a competitor, which may be
another healthcare center, may maliciously provide negative comments, hoping
that the processors would not join the tasks released by this center.
2.3. Design Goals
Using earlier described system model, the goal is to build a trust-based
and privacy-preserving customer selection scheme in ubiquitous computing. In
particular, the following objectives should be captured.
• Privacy: The proposed scheme should preserve processors’ privacy. That
is, other parties cannot infer processors’ location and trajectory informa-
tion based on the given data.
• Security: The proposed scheme should defend against different sophisti-
cated attacks, such as badmouth attack and on-off attack. In addition,
some processors may provide fake trust values and feedbacks. The pro-
posed scheme must be resilient to these attacks.
• Accuracy: The proposed scheme should accurately calculate the reputa-
tion scores of the customers according to processors’ feedbacks. Besides,
the scheme should identify malicious and honest processors, and further
give prediction of their future trust values.
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3. Preliminaries
Bilinear pairing and Paillier cryptosystem are two foundation elements in
the proposed scheme. Hence, we introduce them in this section.
3.1. Bilinear Pairing
Let G and GT be two multiplicative cyclic groups of the same large prime
order q. Then, the following three properties can be satisfied by a bilinear map
e : G×G→ GT .
• Bilinear: e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab, for all P,Q ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗q .
• Non-degenerated: e(P, P ) 6= 1, for any P ∈ G.
• Computable: e(P,Q) can be efficiently computed for all P,Q ∈ G.
We refer to [1, 6, 38] to provide a more comprehensive description and defi-
nition for this technique.
Definition 1. A bilinear parameter generator Gen is a probabilistic algorithm
which takes a security number κ as input, and outputs a 5-tuple (q, P,G,GT , e),
where q is a large prime with κ bits, (G,GT ) are two multiplicative groups with
the same order q, P ∈ G is a generator, and e : G × G → GT is an efficiently
computable bilinear group with the property of non-degeneracy.
Definition 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem). Given the
elements (P, aP, bP ) ∈ G, there exists no probabilistic and polynomial time al-
gorithm to calculate abP ∈ G with non-negligible probability of success.
3.2. Paillier Cryptosystem
This cryptosystem is a form of encryption which supports multiplication
operations on the ciphertexts. Due to the homomorphic properties, it has been
widely used in various privacy-preserving applications [32]. Fundamentally, it
consists of the following three algorithms:
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• Key Generation: Given a large security parameter κ1, and two large
primes p1, q1, where |p1| = |q1| = κ1. Then, n = p1q1 and λ = lcm(p1, q1)
are computed, where lcm(a, b) is a function to compute the least com-
mon multiple of a and b. Define a function L(c) = c−1
n
, µ is calculated
as (L(gλ mod n2))−1 mod n, where g ∈ Z∗n2 is randomly chosen. Then,
the public key pk and secret key sk are generated as pk = (n, g) and
sk = (λ, µ) respectively.
• Encryption: Given a message m ∈ Zn, the ciphertext is calculated as
c = E(m) = gm · rn mod n2, where r ∈ Z∗n is randomly chosen.
• Decryption: Given a ciphertext c ∈ Z∗n2 , the ciphertext can be decrypted
as m = D(c) = L(cλ mod n
2
) · µ mod n. The correctness and security of
the Paillier cryptosystem has been proven in [29].
In particular, the Paillier cryptosystem satisfies the following homomorphic
properties:
• For any m1,m2 ∈ Zn, E(m1) · E(m2) = E(m1 +m2).
• For any m1, a ∈ Zn, E(m1)
a = E(am1).
4. TPCS Scheme
The proposed trust-based and privacy preserving customer selection scheme
includes system initialization, system overview, report generation, report aggre-
gation, feedback evaluation, and trust value evaluation.
4.1. System Initialization
Given security parameters κ and κ1, TA first generates a 5-tuple (q, P,G,
GT , e) by executing Gen(κ), and generates the public key (n = p1 · q1, g) and
private key (λ, µ) of the Paillier cryptosystem. Then, TA selects two secure
cryptographic hash functions H and H1, where H : {0, 1}
∗ → G and H1 :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ1. Before joining the system, all customers, processors, and
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RSUs are required to register themselves with TA. Specifically, TA selects a
secure symmetric encryption algorithm AESk0 by choosing a symmetric key
k0. For every registered customer or processor vi with its real identity IDi,
TA creates a group of pseudonyms {PIDi0, P IDi1, · · · , P IDiN}, and generates
the public and private key pairs as Yij = xijP for j = {0, 1, · · · , N}, where
xij ∈ Z
∗
q is a random value and PIDij = AESk0(IDi||xij). Then, TA selects
a secure number χ ∈ Z∗n to encrypt each processor’s trust value Ti as Ci =
gTi · (ri ·H1(tc||χ))
n mod n2, where tc is the current update time and ri ∈ Z
∗
n,
and then generates the corresponding trust signature as Ci = Ci · g
H1(tc||χ) =
gTi+H1(tc||χ) · rni mod n
2. Note that the trust signature is used to verify if the
trust value is fresh. For every registered RSU, TA selects a random element
xr ∈ Z
∗
q as secret, and calculates the public key as Yr = xrP . Finally, TA sends
the parameter {{PIDij, xij , Yij}
N
j=1, tc, Ci,Ci, n,G,GT , e,H} to each customer
or processor, {n, g, χ, P,G,GT , e, xr, Yr, H} to each RSU, and λ to SP.
4.2. Scheme Overview
When a processor joins a task, it first creates a handshake proof with the
customer to prove that it has joined this task. After finishing the task, both
processor and customer are required to generate their own task reports and
deliver them to RSU. Then RSU verifies the processor’s validity, i.e., to verify
the processor’s task report, handshake proof, and trust value. It then uses pro-
cessors’ trust values and feedbacks to calculate the customer’s reputation score.
Following this, the RSU delivers the reputation score and feedbacks to SP, which
will be then used to evaluate the customers’ performances. Finally, SP sends
processors’ trust values to TA, and TA will predict their future performances
based on the historical data. This complete process is shown in Fig. 3.
4.3. Report Generation
When a processor vj with (PIDj , xj , Cj ,Cj) finishes a task organized by a
customer phk, it is required to send a task report to the nearby RSU, which
is denoted as Rj . Specifically, vj generates the report, including the customer
10
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Figure 3: Overview of TPCS.
phk, task Trk, feedback fj, and a handshake proof with phk. The handshake
proof is used to prove that whether vj actually joined the phk’s task. This proof
is generated as follows.
• The customer phk generates its Paillier Cryptosystem’s public key (nk, gk)
and the secret key (λk, µk). Then, it broadcasts a random value αk ∈ Z
∗
nk
and its public key to all processors.
• The processor vj selects αj , rj ∈ Z
∗
nk
and uses the customer’s homomor-
phic encryption (nk and gk) to calculate Cαj = g
αj
k · r
nk
j mod n
2
k, which is
the ciphertext of αj . Then, the processor delivers the ciphertext Cαj to
the customer.
• After receiving the ciphertext, the customer recovers αj and calculates the
proof as proofkj = xkH(αk + αj). Accordingly, the processor calculates
its proof as proofjk = xjH(αj + αk).
Then, to prevent the RSU or other attackers linking vj ’s trust value, vj
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selects a random vale r′j ∈ Z
∗
n to perturb the trust ciphertext as C˜j = g
Tj ·
(rj · H1(tc||χ))
n · (r′j)
n mod n2 1. Accordingly, the trust signature is also
recalculated as C˜j = g
Tj+H1(tc||χ) · rnj · (r
′
j)
n mod n2. After that, vj uses
xj to generate a signature as σj = xj(PIDj||Yj ||FRj ||TRj|| proofjk), where
FRj = (phk||Trk||fj) is the feedback report, and TRj = (C˜j ||C˜j ||tc) is the trust
report. Finally, vj submits the report Rj = (PIDj , Yj , FRj , TRj, proofjk, σj)
to RSU when it finishes the task. Accordingly, phk uploads its report Rk =
(phk, T rk, {proofkj}
num
j=1 , σk), where num is the total number of processors in
the task Trk and σk = xkH(phk||Trk||{proofkj}
num
j=1 ).
4.4. Report Aggregation
Upon receiving the reports, RSU first verifies the processor’s signature σj ,
i.e., to check whether e(P, σj)
?
= e(Yj , H(PIDj ||Yj ||FRj ||TRj||proofjk)). If it
does hold, the signature is valid and RSU will accept vj ’s report, since e(P, σj) =
e(P, xjH(PIDj||Yj ||FRj ||TRj||proofjk)) = e(Yj , H(PIDj ||Yj ||FRj ||TRj||proofjk)).
To improve verification efficiency with less overhead, RSU can perform batch
verification as:
e(P,
sum∑
j=1
σj) = e(P,
sum∑
j=1
xjH(PIDj||Yj ||FRj ||TRj||proofjk))
=
sum∏
j=1
e(P, xjH(PIDj||Yj ||FRj ||TRj||proofjk))
=
sum∏
j=1
e(Yj , H(PIDj||Yj ||FRj ||TRj||proofjk)).
(1)
By this way, the verification can be completed by executing only sum+1 rather
than 2sum pairing operations.
After the validity checking, RSU will verify vj ’s handshake proof, i.e., proofjk,
to check whether it has joined the task. Specifically, RSU verifies e(Yk, proofjk)
?
=
e(Yj , proofkj). If it holds, the proof is verified, since e(Yk, proofjk) = e(xkP, xjH(αj+
1In this paper, g is not public to the processors, and processors can only use the public
key n to perturb the ciphertexts.
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αk)) = e(xjP, xkH(αk+αj)) = e(Yj , proofkj). Similarly, RSU can also perform
batch verification, that is, to check if e(Yk,
∑sum
j=1 proofjk)
?
=
∏sum
j=1 e(Yj , proofkj).
The proof is given as follows.
e(Yk,
sum∑
j=1
proofjk) = e(Yk,
sum∑
j=1
xjH(αj + αk))
=
sum∏
j=1
e(xkP, xjH(αj + αk))
=
sum∏
j=1
e(P, xkxjH(αj + αk))
=
sum∏
j=1
e(xjP, xkH(αj + αk))
=
sum∏
j=1
e(Yj , proofkj).
(2)
Besides the above operations, it is also important to check if the trust value,
i.e., Tj, is truthful and fresh, as some malicious processors may change their
trust values. To achieve this goal, RSU first checks the time stamp tc, and then
checks the trust signature C˜j . Specifically, RSU checks if C˜j · g
H1(tc||χ) equals
to C˜j · (H1(tc||χ))
n, as C˜j · g
H1(tc||χ) = gTj · (rj ·H1(tc||χ))
n · (r′j)
n · gH1(tc||χ) =
gTj+H1(tc||χ) ·(rj ·r
′
j ·H1(tc||χ))
n = C˜j ·(H1(tc||χ))
n
. Similarly, RSU can perform
batch verification to check gH1(tc||χ) ·
∑sum
j=1 C˜j
?
= (H1(tc||χ))
n
·
∑sum
j=1 C˜j . The
proof is given as follows.
gH1(tc||χ) ·
sum∑
j=1
C˜j =
sum∑
j=1
(gTj+H1(tc||χ) · (rj · r
′
j ·H1(tc||χ))
n)
= (H1(tc||χ))
n ·
sum∑
j=1
C˜j
(3)
RSU performs the following steps to generate the aggregated report.
• Step 1. Compute the aggregated weighted data according to {fj , C˜j}
sum
j=1
13
as
C1 =
sum∏
j=1
C˜
fj
j mod n
2
=
sum∏
j=1
gTjfj · (rj · r
′
j ·H1(tc||χ))
nfj mod n2
= g
∑sum
j=1 Tjfj · (
sum∏
j=1
(rjr
′
jH1(tc||χ))
fj )n mod n2
(4)
C2 =
sum∏
j=1
C˜j mod n
2
= g
∑sum
j=1 Tj · (
sum∏
j=1
(rjr
′
jH1(tc||χ)))
n mod n2
(5)
• Step 2: Use the private key xr to generate a signature σg as
σr = xrH(phk||Trk||C1||C2||{PIDj||fj}
sum
j=1 ). (6)
• Step 3: Deliver the integrated reportRr = (phk, T rk, C1, C2, {PIDj, fj}
sum
j=1 ,
σr) to SP.
4.5. Reputation Score Evaluation
After receiving the report Rr, SP first validates the report by checking if
e(P, σr) equals to e(Yr, H(phk||Trk||C1||C2||{PIDj||fj}
sum
j=1 )). Then TA de-
crypts C1, C2 by using the secret key λ, µ, and calculates the reputation score
RSk as follows.
RSk =
D(C1)
D(C2)
=
L(Cλ mod n
2
1 ) · µ mod n
L(Cλ mod n
2
2 ) · µ mod n
=
∑sum
j=1 Tjfj∑sum
j=1 Tj
.
(7)
Note that, RSk is calculated based on processors’ previous trust values. To
evaluate the qualities of processors’ feedbacks in the task Trk, we design a
filtering truth discovery based evaluation algorithm. The basic idea is to assign
a higher weight to a processor if its data is closer to the reputation score, and
the data provided by a processor with higher weight will be more likely to be
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considered as the truthful reputation score [21, 22, 26, 27, 42]. More specifically,
Vk = [v1, v2, · · · , vsum] represents the set of processors which belongs to the task
Trk, and is updated in each iteration since some processors may be removed.
The filtering truth discovery based algorithm is achieved by the following steps.
• Data filtering: For a processor vj ∈ Vk, SP calculates the difference be-
tween each processor’s feedback and the reputation score, and then re-
moves the processors whose difference is less than a threshold, i.e.,
|fj −RS
(v)
k | < Uthreshold, (8)
where RS
(v)
k denotes phk’s reputation score in the v-th iteration.
• Weight update: SP calculates the difference between each processor’s feed-
back and the customer’s reputation score, and then updates each proces-
sor’s weight based on the aggregated differences. Without loss of general-
ity, we adopt a logarithmic weight function, which has been widely used
in truth discovery based applications [26, 42].
w
(v)
j = log(
∑
vj∈V
(v)
k
d(fj , RS
(v)
k )
d(fj , RS
(v)
k )
), (9)
where d(·) is a distance function calculated as d(fj , RS
(v)
k ) = (fj−RS
(v)
k )
2.
• Reputation score update: Based on the processors’ weights, the reputation
score for the customer can be estimated as
RS
(v+1)
k =
∑
vj∈V
(v)
k
w
(v)
j · fj∑
vj∈V
(v)
k
w
(v)
j
. (10)
The above procedures will be iteratively conducted until the change of the
reputation score between two consecutive iterations is less than a predefined
threshold. Then, SP publishes the customer’s reputation score. The general
procedure of the filtering truth discovery based evaluation algorithm is shown
in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: Filtering truth discovery based evaluation algorithm
Input: processors’ feedbacks {fj}
sum
j=1
Output: Reputation score RSk, processors’ trust values {Tj}
sum
j=1
1 for iteration = 1, 2, · · · , v do
2 Update the set of processors (see Eq. 8);
3 for vj ∈ V
(v)
k do
4 Update processors’ trust values (see Eq. 9);
5 Update the reputation score (see, Eq. 10);
6 return RSk;
4.6. Trust Value Evaluation
Based on the reputation score, SP can also obtain processors’ new trust
values. Motivated by [15], we define a function to measure the qualities of
processors’ trust values.
Tj =


1− |fj −RSk|
v·c0 |fj −RSk| < Fthreshold
1− |fj −RSk| otherwise
(11)
where v is the number of iterations. It is obvious that if there are more malicious
processors, v will be larger and it will be more difficult to obtain the accurate
reputation score. Thus, v can be used as a reward for the processors whose
feedbacks contribute to the accurate reputation score calculation. Besides, we
define another factor c0 to control the reward sensitivity. If the difference be-
tween a processor’s feedback and the reputation score is more than a threshold
Fthreshold, then the feedback does not make any positive effect on the reputa-
tion score and hence the processor will not obtain the reward. Then, SP delivers
processors’ trust values [(PID1, T1), (PID2, T2), · · · , (PIDsum, Tsum)] to TA.
On receiving the trust values, TA first uses the symmetric key t0 to retrieve
processors’ real identities, and then predicts processors’ future trust values ac-
cording to their historical behaviors. Here, we use the exponential weighted
moving average (EMWA) technique to estimate processors’ future behaviors, as
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it gives more consideration of processors’ most recent performances [33, 34].
Tj(i+1) = α× Tj(i−1) + (1− α)× Tji, (12)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is an impact factor, and Tj(i−1), Tji and Tj(i+1) are the past,
current and future trust values respectively .
Note that, some processors may behave well at the beginning to improve
their trust values, and behave badly when these values are high enough. To
counter the effect of this attack, we further design a trust value circuit-breaker
mechanism as:
Tj(i+1) =


T0 Tj(i−1) − Tji > Tthreshold
Tj(i+1) otherwise
(13)
From this equation, we can see if the decrease between two consecutive trust
values is larger than a predefined threshold, the trust value will be set as the
initialized value T0. Moreover, to punish the on-off attacker, once the circuit-
breaker is triggered, the predicted trust value will be decreased as Tj(i+1) =
c1 ·Tj(i+1), where c1 ∈ (0, 1) is a forgetting factor. In this way, the attacker will
take more time to bring its trust value to the previous level.
5. Security Analysis
Before presenting the evaluation, we first discuss the security analysis of our
proposed TPCS scheme. In particular, according to the security model discussed
earlier, we first focus on how TPCS scheme can achieve processor’s report pri-
vacy preservation, authentication and data integrity, and then we discuss some
attack strategies and give the resilience analysis against them.
5.1. Security analysis for processor’s report
The processor’s report is privacy-preserving. In this proposed scheme, pro-
cessor’s trust information is encrypted as a valid Paillier ciphertext Cj = g
Mj ·
Rnj mod n
2 if we consider the trust values Tj and Tj +H1(tc||χ) as the message
Mj, and the random values rj , rj ·H1(tc||χ), and rj ·H1(tc||χ) ·r
′
j as Rj . As the
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Paillier Cryptosystem can defend from the chosen plaintext attack, the trust
value achieves semantic security and privacy preservation. Hence, although an
adversary may eavesdrop the ciphertext Cj , it cannot identify the original data.
After collecting processors’ reports, RSU will compute C1 and C2 to aggregate
all reports. However, the RSU or an adversary cannot get each individual’s trust
value without the secret key. Finally, SP can recover C1 and C2 as
∑sum
j=1 Tj · fj
and
∑sum
j=1 Tj. Nevertheless, since the decrypted data is aggregated results, it
cannot get each individual processor’s trust value (T1, T2, · · · , Tsum). Therefore,
the processor’s report is privacy-preserving.
The processor’s report achieves authentication and data integrity. The pro-
cessor’s report is signed using the BLS short signature [7]. As the BLS signature
has been proven to be secure under the CDH problem [5], any malicious behav-
iors of an adversary can be detected, and accordingly our proposed scheme can
guarantee the report’s authentication and data integrity.
5.2. Resilience analysis against attacks launched by adversaries
Resilience to link attack: From TPCS scheme’s perspective, link attack
means that an attacker may link a certain vj to its identity or trust value.
To prevent the identity link attack, vj can change its pseudonym when it joins
different tasks, which will make them unlinkable. However, given that the trust
value remains unchanged for some time, it may still be linked according to its
trust value. In our proposed scheme, vj does not submit its original trust values
directly to the RSU. Instead, the trust value is encrypted, and vj changes the
ciphertext by multiplying a random value (r′j)
n when it takes part in a different
task (i.e., Cj → C˜j = Cj · (r
′
j)
n mod n2). Besides, although SP owns the secret
key λ, it still cannot trace any individual processor as the encrypted trust values
have been aggregated in RSU before uploading to SP.
Resilience to fake trust value attack: In this scheme, the trust value is en-
crypted and hence the processor has no method to know its real trust level.
However, some malicious processor may provide a fake trust value by colluding
with other processors or using its previous data. In such a case, our scheme is
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still effective as we use time stamp tc to generate the trust ciphertext and trust
signature, i.e., (Cj = g
Tj ·(rj ·H1(tc||χ))
n vs. Cj = g
Tj+H1(tc||χ)·rnj ). Specifically,
for the first collusion attack (vj is in collusion with vi for example), vj submits its
falsified trust report as Ĉj = Cj ·Ci = g
Tj+Ti ·(rjri(H1(tc||χ))
2)n, Ĉj = Cj ·Ci =
gTj+Ti+2H1(tc||χ) · (rjri)
n. Since Ĉj · g
H1(tc||χ) 6= Ĉj · (H1(tc||χ))
n
, this malicious
manipulation will be identified by RSU. For the second reply attack, vj submits
its previous trust report C′j = g
T ′j · (r′jH1(t
′
c||χ))
n, C′j = g
T ′j+H1(t
′
c||χ) · (r′j)
n.
Also, it still cannot pass the authentication, as C′j ·g
H1(tc||χ) 6= C′j · (H1(tc||χ))
n
.
Resilience to badmouth attack: From TPCS scheme’s perspective, a bad-
mouth attack means that the attackers may always provide low feedbacks for
customers. Specifically, the badmouth attackers can be categorized into internal
and external attackers. For the external badmouth attackers, we design report
authentication and handshake protocols to ensure that only the valid processors
which register with the system and join the task can pass the authentication.
For the internal badmouth attackers, the proposed scheme incorporates a filter-
ing truth discovery based reputation evaluation algorithm to distinguish among
truths which deviate from ground truth.
Resilience to on-off attack: In the proposed scheme, an on-off attack means
that some malicious processors may perform well to hide themselves before
launching attacks. When they attain high trust values, they launch attacks and
then remain dormant for a certain time period to regain their trust. This attack
is hard to defend against using the traditional methods. In our scheme, we
design a circuit-breaker mechanism to handle this problem, which is motivated
by a common human nature that people make great efforts to build up trust
values and some bad behaviors will destroy them. Specifically, we define a
Tthreshold, and once the decrease of two consecutive trust values is larger than
the predefined threshold, the circuit-breaker will be triggered. Besides, to punish
the on-off attacker, its trust value will be decreased by multiplying a forgetting
factor c0 ∈ (0, 1) in a long time. That is, the attacker will take a long time
to build up its trust value to the previous level. Thus, our proposed scheme
mitigates the on-off attack.
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6. Performance Evaluation
Here, we evaluate the performance of TPCS scheme in terms of efficiency
and effectiveness in task selection. The proposed scheme is implemented in
Java, and all experiments are conducted on a system with Intel Core i7 2.5 GHz
processor and 16GB RAM. The detailed parameter setting is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: The Parameters for evaluation
Notation Definition Value
κ, κ1 security parameter κ, κ1 = 512
q Generator of Bilinear Pairing q = 512
p1, p2 Generator of Paillier cryptosystem p1, q1 = 512
mh number of customers 10
sum number of processors 50
ρ malicious processor proportion 20%
T0 initial trust value 0.01
c0 reward sensitivity 0.1
c1 forgetting factor 0.85
α impact factor parameter 0.3
v number of iterations 10
Uthreshold threshold which triggers set update 0.5
Fthreshold threshold which triggers reward 0.2
Tthreshold threshold which triggers circuit-breaker 0.5
6.1. Efficiency Analysis
In this experiment, the aim is to evaluate the efficiency of TPCS scheme
in terms of authentication and ciphertexts aggregation. Every experiment is
executed 10 times and the average result is used for analysis. Note that, in
the proposed scheme, three authentication protocols (i.e., report authentica-
tion, handshake authentication, trust authentication) are designed for proces-
sors’ verification. Fig. 4 illustrates the computational cost of the authentication
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varying against the number of processors. As can be seen, since we use batch
verification in each authentication, the verification is finished with fewer pair-
ing operations, and accordingly the running time is much less as compared to
no batch verification. In Fig. 5, we plot the running time of ciphertexts ag-
gregation. From this figure, we can observe that as the number of processors
increases, our scheme can efficiently perform the ciphertexts aggregation. This
is evident from the fact that only 317 ms is required to execute the ciphertext
aggregation for 500 processors.
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Figure 4: Computational cost for each authentication.
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Figure 5: Computational cost for ciphertexts aggregation.
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6.2. Effectiveness Analysis
In order to analyze the correctness of the system, we vary the percentage
of malicious processors. The malicious processors will provide untruthful feed-
backs, that is, their feedbacks are much higher or lower than the truthful eval-
uation. All processors are initialized with the same trust value T0. After the
execution of our proposed truth discovery based evaluation algorithm, we ob-
serve the value change of the customer and processors.
Fig. 6 plots the reputation score of the customer where the percentage of
malicious processors is set as 10 and 25 percent respectively, i.e., ρ = 10% and
ρ = 25%. As can be seen, the reputation score tends to be stable after the fourth
round. When the number of malicious processors accounts for 10% of the total
number of processors, the reputation score is equivalent to 0.787. When there
are more malicious feedbacks, the reputation score witnesses a downward trend,
while is still in a reasonable range. Fig. 7 presents the trust value of a single
malicious processor and a single honest processor where ρ = 10% and ρ = 25%.
It is obvious that the malicious processor gets the lower trust value after the
experiments, which demonstrates the correctness of TPCS scheme.
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Figure 6: Reputation score comparison (ρ = 10% and ρ = 25%).
We also analyze the effectiveness of the scheme for resilience to on-off attack.
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Figure 7: Trust values comparison for honest and malicious processor.
Recall that an on-off attack means that a processor behaves well to accumulate
its trust value at the beginning, and give untruthful feedback when its trust
value is high enough. To mitigate the effect of this attack, we design a circuit-
breaker mechanism and apply the forgetting factor. As shown in Fig. 8, without
the forgetting factor (i.e., the black line), the processor performs well in the first
five tasks, and its trust value rises up to 0.8165. After launching the badmouth
attack, its trust value decreases quickly, which however rises up to 0.8045 after
only four more tasks. In contrast, with the forgetting factor (i.e., red line), it
triggers the circuit-breaker at the sixth task, and its trust value rises slowly at
the later task. That is, the attacker will need more time to bring its trust value
to the previous level and hence demonstrates the effectiveness of TPCS scheme.
7. Related work
By taking advantage of the increasingly powerful computation and commu-
nication capabilities of smart devices, ubiquitous computing has received con-
siderable attention in recent years [2, 20, 25]. As a special computing paradigm,
ubiquitous computing integrates nearby devices and provides tremendous novel
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Figure 8: Trust value comparison based on on-off attacks.
services by exploiting their idle computing and communication resources. This
enables complex computing possible at anytime, anywhere, and by different
means. Recently, many ubiquitous computing based applications have been
studied and proposed, such as data mining [43], human activity recognition
[23], disease support [28], and ambient intelligence [3]. However, the selection of
a reliable customer while not disclosing processors’ privacy is still an unsolved
problem.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing schemes have solved
this problem. Generally, to find a reliable customer and help processors avoid
selecting the misbehaving customers, a potential approach is to evaluate the
trustworthiness of the customers and processors. Recently, many trust models
have been proposed in VANET [8],[15],[18],[30],[31],[48]. Specifically, in [30],
Patwardhan et al. proposed a context-aware reputation management approach
for vehicular ad hoc networks, which provides a bootstrapping method to enable
vehicles to establish trust relationships. Nevertheless, since it lacks of robustness
and scalability, their proposed model cannot be directly used in the task. Raya
et al. [31] presented a data-oriented trust establishment scheme. However,
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their framework is not efficient in handling the large amount of feedback data
in a task scenario. Zhu et al. [48] described a trust management scheme for
vehicular crowdsensing applications. Hu et al. [15] presented a reliable and
trust-based task service selection scheme. By building a trust-based evaluation
model, their scheme can defend against several sophisticated attacks in VANET.
However, their scheme ignores the outside attackers and cannot be executed
with an untrusted service provider. Javed [18] presented a security adaptation
scheme to improve the quality of service (QoS) of safety applications. In their
scheme, several factors such as connectivity duration, near s’ centrality metrics,
and security level are combined to calculate the trust level. However, their
work focuses on the QoS in Vehicular Sensor Networks (VSNs) and it is not
suitable in the applications of ubiquitous computing. Zhu et al. [46] used
blockchain to realize controllable and trustworthy data management in cloud
environment. As for the security and trust in ubiquitous computing, some works
have been proposed recently. In [37], Xing et al. defined individuals’ contexts to
be private information and based on this they proposed a context aggregation
and sharing scheme which could achieve trust and privacy preservation. In [17],
an adaptive trust and selection scheme is proposed to realize access control for
pervasive environment. In [4], Akram te al. summarized the literature related
to security, privacy, and trust issues in user-centric solutions. However, to our
best knowledge, none of the existing works have focused on how to select reliable
customers for the data processors, which inspires to design a trust-based and
privacy-preserving customer selection scheme for ubiquitous computing. Besides
the above works, we also study the potential security and privacy issues in
internet of things and sensor networks [9, 10, 11, 36, 44, 35], as the core of
ubiquitous computing is to take advantage of various computing devices.
8. Conclusion
In this article we proposed a trust-based and privacy-preserving customer
selection scheme for processors before they join a ubiquitous computing task.
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Considering the uncertainty of processors’ behaviors, we design a filtering truth
discovery based evaluation mechanism to calculate the customers’ reputation
scores and processors’ trust values. In addition, three authentication protocols
are designed to ensure that only the valid processors can pass the authentication.
Security analysis and simulation results establish the security and effectiveness
of the proposed scheme. Using similar approach, we aim to address other trust
and privacy challenges in different ubiquitous computing based application sce-
narios.
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